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On a normal working day, a plot is presented to You that will
change your life forever. The plot (Fig. 1A) represents your variable
life-adjusted display (VLAD) curves depicted versus VLAD curves
from your ‘competing’ colleagues. This VLAD curve, a real case, a
real plot (the surgeon is not an author of this letter), presents a
plot of your cumulative sum of the difference in expected and
observed outcome; the unit of measurement is ‘lives’. The
expected outcome is based on an adjustment or scoring system.
The VLAD curve, a valuable tool in the monitoring of a process, is
based on the statistical principle of process variability. In your
case, the lines separated and a difference in quality of care
seemed to be identified. In similar instances, as in your case,
careers have been damaged.
The first thing any informed observer picks up is the absence of
the uncertainty of the scientific observation, but in addition 22%
of your case volume was missing (without agreement) excluding
operations supervised by you, not because of a specific higher
risk. The same has happened with the plots of the ‘competing’ sur-
geons, even though there might be a difference in their concept
of patients eligible for supervised procedures. Later on, it was
identified that there were considerable events in their excluded
cases and none in your own excluded ones. Figure 1B presents
100% of your case volume with the 99% confidence limits, clearly
indicating that your VLAD curve falls within the scientific un-
certainty of an observation. But the issue is not closed, on the
contrary!
Outcome analysis is a science and there are fundamental laws
of science and nature that need to be respected and were not in
this case. Some examples are the uncertainty of a scientific obser-
vation, the continuity and the variability of nature. In addition,
outcome analysis is the analysis of rare events, with all its specifici-
ties. It is the intention of this editorial to address these limitations
and propose a checklist to follow if similar events should repeat
itself.
The evaluation of a rare event can be approached using differ-
ent pathways [1], as there are statistical forecasting, expert judge-
ment, decomposed judgement, structured analogies, adjusted
judgement, Delphi, prediction markets and scenario planning.
Your plot used a VLAD format of depiction, but the underlying
process used was statistical forecasting with well-known limitations.
If the reference database (the original database from which an
adjustment equation is created) or the mathematical model is
sparse or inappropriate, then the adjustment process becomes
unreliable. Misplaced causality is possibly embedded and the
issue of frame blindness is not addressed.
‘Sparsity’ identifies the richness of a database: the number and
format of the variables, the completeness versus all possible vari-
ability and the density of the outlying values. If a clinical database
does not have a sufficient number of patients with extreme
obesity, then this variable can never be corrected for. In addition,
not just the surgeon needs to be identified and corrected for, but
all major players in the complete hospital care process, from ad-
mission to discharge. Even if one has a perfect coefficient for the
separate rare comorbidities, then a correct estimation of the even
more rare combination of these rare comorbidities creates statis-
tical issues that need to be corrected for (or the patients deleted
from analysis). It is obvious that sparsity refers also to the quality
of data input and checking (audit and consistency). ‘Inappropriate’
identifies how the case mix of the reference(s) database relates to
the index database (yours), to the observation interval and also to
the quality of the adjustment system. An observation of the events
of the hospital stay or even first month after a therapy has no rele-
vance to the quality of care of that therapy, unless the expected
survival before the therapy would be expressed in minutes or
hours. ‘Causality’ is the direct or indirect relation between a set of
factors and a phenomenon or event. ‘Frame blindness’ is solving
the wrong problem because one has created a mental framework
for one’s decision, overlooking the best options or losing sight of
important objectives.
In your plot, the issue of the reference database is very complex
since there are several databases. The reference database of the
adjustment system is the core dataset used for the adjustment
scoring system. But in this process, you are not just compared with
the scoring system but also with the performance of other com-
peting surgeons, without any additional correction; it needs to be
proven that no correction was needed. In that comparison, the
reference databases are the datasets where the VLAD curves of
the competing surgeons originate. The index database is the
dataset from which your VLAD curve originates.
The reference database of the adjustment system (Table 1) was
the EuroSCORE 1 dataset [2, 3]. The case mix of this database was
never compared, but is very different from the index database.
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The outcome event of the adjustment database was primary hos-
pital mortality, very different from the early risk and even more
from the ‘quality of care’ of the procedure. This outcome event is
a real event, not a medical decision. The outcome event interval is
biased since it was not based on hazard function analysis. The
time frame of the adjustment database is very different. The vari-
ables do not cover all possible variability. Most variability was only
documented in a single expression. There was absolutely no infor-
mation about the density of the extremes of risk. The variables
were not stored in their original format. There was no proof of any
consistency in the creation of the different datasets composing
the adjustment database. The completeness and the accuracy of
the data or of the follow-up were never audited. Some quality cri-
teria of the adjustment system are known, most are not. A border-
line reasonable receiving operating characteristics/area under the
curve (close to 0.8) was reached in the internal validation and in
some external databases, mostly due to the appropriate predic-
tion of the survivors but a very poor one (<10% correct) of the
deceased patients (positive predictive value). On the 14 possible
quality criteria, the adjustment database scored 13 possible or
certain elements of bias. Recalibrating the coefficients would not
repair these biases.
The index and competing databases need to undergo the same
critical analysis. Even though your own index database or the data-
bases of the competing surgeons could be physically registered
into the same software, their data process, completeness and flow
could be different. The power of the index versus the competing
database sizes has not been calculated. The confidence limits have
not been calculated; what is seen on Figure 1B is our own add-
ition. The case mix differences have not been calculated, in add-
ition there was no common definition about the supervision
Figure 1: (A) The VLAD curve of the involved surgeon (with 22% of the actual
case volume deleted). The x-axis is the number of procedures over 1 year. (B)
The VLAD curve that could have been plotted, including all the patients treated
by the involved surgeon that year and including the 99% confidence limits.
VLAD: variable life-adjusted display.
Table 1: Checklist of quality criteria of the reference database of the adjustment system and of the index and competing databases
1. How good is the reference database
Is the adjustment database appropriate in case mix?
Is the adjustment based on a generic equation or on a domain-specific equation?
Is the adjustment database appropriate in outcome event for the desired assessment?
Is this outcome event a real event, or is this a medical decision or intervention?
Is the adjustment database appropriate in outcome interval for the desired assessment?
Is the adjustment database appropriate in timeframe?
Do the variables of the adjustment database cover all variability?
Do the variables of the adjustment database exist in different expressions?
Is there enough density of the extremes of risk in the adjustment database?
Are the variables of the adjustment database stored and analysed in their original format?
Is there consistency in the creation of the adjustment database?
Has there been an internal/external quality audit of the adjustment database?
Are the data and the follow-up of the adjustment database complete?
How good are the quality criteria of the adjustment system (scoring system)? Are they known and do they reach acceptable values?
2. How good and comparable are the index and competing databases?
Is there sufficient power to compare the competing with the index databases?
If there is sufficient power, have the confidence limits been calculated and presented?
If there is sufficient power, are the competing and index databases similar in case mix?
Do the adjustment databases, the index and competing databases include the same outcome event?
Do the index, the competing and the adjustment databases carry the same variables and with the same definitions?
Is the consistency in creation of the index and the competing databases similar?
Has there been a similar internal/external quality audit of the index and the competing databases?
Are the data and the follow-up of the index and the competing databases complete?
Do the index and competing databases carry all the procedural and institutional variables and have they been corrected for?
How good has the adjustment system scored on the dataset, combining the index and the competing datasets in ROC/AUC, PPV NPV…?
ROC: receiving operating characteristics; AUC: area under the curve; PPV: positive predictive value; NPV: negative predictive value.
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cases. The outcome event of the adjustment, the index and the
competing databases are ill-defined. The variables and definitions
were neither defined nor analysed versus the adjustment data-
base. The consistency, apparently different, was not analysed.
There has been no internal/external audit, no outlier or no com-
pleteness analysis of the index and competing databases. No add-
itional variability has been corrected for.
On that same, apparently not so normal, working day,
your life changes and your surgical career is over. A personal
tragedy, but what will happen to the system you work in? Your
colleagues take over the patients you used to operate on and
will probably experience a downward shift in their VLAD curve,
and/or your colleagues will take a more conservative approach
in accepting patients for surgery. It is the patient who will be
denied appropriate care. A surgeon works in a complex system;
the correct approach in dealing with negative outliers is to first
analyse the system before, if at all, pointing to an individual in
the system.
The VLAD and similar methods originate from the industry,
where quality control can easily be translated as ‘on target with
minimal variation’. In the medical field, however, there are much
more inherent variabilities, case mix, risk variables, etc. As statistic-
al forecasting is highly dependable on the quality of the data (col-
lection process), the appropriateness of the applied model and
the methodological approach used, we may not assume that a
negative outlier is by definition an underperformer. Therefore, if a
VLAD shows a run of bad events, suggesting that the process is out
of control, this can only be interpreted as a warning signal, and
nothing else. It must be the start of further investigation of the
process, beginning with the data registration itself and including
both content and organization. Additionally, it requires prede-
fined analytical methods that adequately correct for case mix to
ascertain a systematic approach and to avoid ‘cherry picking’ as
illustrated in the case above. Usually, several years of practice are
needed to form the basis of such a plot. Sometimes, it will
demand exclusion of patients from the analysis because their vari-
ability cannot be corrected for, even though clinical judgement
considers these patients high risk. Finally, we need to implement
in clinical practice periodical evaluations of quality of cardiac
surgery care including—but surely not solely depending on—
VLADs, and committing all medical specialists in the system who
are involved in the care for cardiac surgery patients, in order to
achieve continuous improvement in the healthcare process.
What happened to You on that particular working day, reflects
an undesirable attitude among a surgical specialty that has always
been excelling by standing out and taking risks for patients. The
misinterpretation of surgical outcome data as illustrated above will
lead to risk avoidance, mediocracy and suboptimal care for
patients requiring cardiac surgery.
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